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The Riparian Right of Streamflow Protection
in the Eastern States
Peter N. Davis

*

INTRODUCTION
Increased demand for water by irrigators, industry,
public water systems and power plants raises the problem of
protecting minimum flows in streams for fish and wildlife
habitat, recreational uses and waste assimilation capacity.
Streamflows vary throughout the year. In the eastern states,
flows tend to peak in the spring and fall and to reach low
levels in late summer.' Late summer is the time when irrigation and public water system diversions tend to peak. On
streams with low base flow contributions from groundwater,
flows may be inadequate to provide water for both consump2
tive diversions and for instream uses.
While this competition between consumptive and instream uses has received attention in the western states for
several years,3 only recently has it begun to receive more
*
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2. The situation in Missouri probably is typical. See MISSOURI INSTREAM
FLOW REQUIREMENTS, supra note 1, at 71-92.
3. Tarlock, Recent Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western
Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 871; J.F. ORSBORNE & C.H. ALLMAN, INSTREAM
FLOW NEEDS (1976); Tarlock, Appropriationfor Instream Flow Maintenance.- A Progress Report on "New" Public Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211;
Tarlock, Recognition of InstreamFlow Rights: "New" Public Western WaterRights, 25
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than minimal attention in the eastern states.4 Minimum
stream flows for instream uses can be protected under either

the riparian doctrine or diversion permit statutes. Most of

the 36 eastern states 5 still rely on the riparian doctrine to al-

locate water between users. Some have enacted comprehensive diversion permit statutes which replace riparian rights.
This article analyzes the extent to which the riparian doctrine can be employed to protect minimum streamflows for

purposes of maintaining fish and wildlife habitat, recreational use capacity and waste assimilative capacity of watercourses in the eastern states.7

The riparian doctrine provides that each owner of land
abutting on a stream is entitled both to continuation of
streamflow to his land as it flowed in a state of nature and to
make a reasonable use of that water. Nonriparians do not
have a right to use water in a stream.9 The reasonableness of
that use is determined by the character of the stream from
which the water is diverted, the nature and location of the
24-1 (1979); Johnson, Public Trust Protection/orStream
Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. D. L. REV. 233 (1980); Comment, FederalProtection
ofinstream Values, 57 NEB. L. REV. 368 (1978); Comment, Minimum StreamflowsFederalPower to Secure, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 799 (1975).
4. MISSOURI INSTREAM FLOW REQUIREMENTS, supra note 1.
5. The Eastern states encompass all states located along the west bank of the
Mississippi River and to the east.
6. The Eastern permit statutes are analyzed comprehensively in the author's
forthcoming article Eastern Water Diversion Statutes.- Precedents/ora MissouriFuture?, to be published in the Mo. L. REv., Summer 1982. See also Ausness, Water
Use Permits in a Riparian State.: Problemsand Proposals,66 Ky. L.J. 191 (1977-78);
P. Davis, Australian andAmerican Water Allocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C. INDUS.
& COMM. L. REV. 647, 697-05 (1968); Plager & Maloney, Emerging PatternsforRegulation of Consumptive Use of Water in the Eastern United States, 43 IND. L.J. 383
(1968); Heath, Water Management Legislation in the Eastern States, 2 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 99 (1967); MISSOURI INSTREAM FLOW REQUIRE:ENTS, supra note I, at 195232.
7. Protection of minimum stream flows under diversion permit statutes is discussed in the articles cited supra at note 6.
8. The riparian doctrine was first formulated in its modem form in Tyler v.
Wilkinson, 4 Mason 397, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827). Since that time nearly
3,000 decisions employing the riparian doctrine have been published. P. Davis, Unpublished Research, Summer 1975.
See, e.g., Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964); Harris v. Brooks, 225
Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
9. See, e.g., Heilbron v. Fowler Switch Canal Co., 75 Cal. 426, 17 P. 535 (1888).
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
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claimant riparian's use, the degree to which upstream riparians are precluded from making uses in order to make water
available to claimant riparian, and the nature and location
of the upstream and downstream riparians' uses.' 0
The riparian doctrine contains an internal inconsistency
since it is frequently impossible both to maintain natural
flow and to allow riparians to make reasonable uses, because
the latter either alters flow patterns or consumes water. Because of that inconsistency, courts have been forced to emphasize either the natural flow or the reasonable use theories
of the riparian doctrine.
The natural flow theory provides that every riparian is
entitled to the natural flow of the watercourse in both quantity and quality, subject only to the domestic uses of upper
riparians. His riparian right is violated by any use or diversion which diminishes the flow past his land. It is irrelevant
whether he actually is injured by the diminution. The diminishing of the flow in itself affords the lower riparian a
cause of action against the diverting riparian unless the
water is being used for domestic purposes, in which case the
diverter is free to take as much of the water as he needs.
The reasonable use theory allows each riparian to use
and divert the water in quantities which are reasonable, taking into consideration the size and nature of the body of
water and the needs of other riparians." It is a comparative
reasonableness theory. The courts maintain that each riparian is entitled to make reasonable use of the flow and that,
if the lower riparian does not suffer any actual damage, he
cannot have the diversion enjoined. Reduction in flow is
characterized as damnum absque injuria-harmwithout injury.' 2 However, no riparian is entitled to take all of the
10. See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Evans v.
Merriwether, 4 11. (3 Scam.) 492 (1842).
11. See 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979).
12. On the natural flow and reasonable use theories generally, see Harris v.
Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
On the need for injury in order to have a cause of action under the reasonable
use theory, see Gehlen v. Knorr, 101 Iowa 700, 70 N.W. 757 (1897); Stratton v. Mt.
Hermon Boys School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913).
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water in a stream to the injury of another riparian. 3
Over the last 100 years, most courts in the United States
have elected to emphasize the reasonable use aspect of the
doctrine,' 4 although that election is not unanimous. 5 Most
cases discussing the riparian doctrine involve conflicts between diverters, or between diverters and mills. Relatively
few involve private recreational use by riparians, such as
boating and fishing. None involve private maintenance of
fish and wildlife habitat. In spite of the sparcity of relevant
case precedent, it is clear that riparians have a right to make
recreational uses of watercourses on which their lands abut
and that that right is as much entitled to protection as consumptive uses of water. Although riparians have a right to
discharge wastes to a reasonable extent, provided a nuisance
is not created, no cases protect the assimilative capacity of
the stream which that rule would seem to require.
The following sections discuss various aspects of
streamflow protection. They are divided into four groups.
The first group of sections examines the law of protecting the
level of lakes and reservoirs. They involve court recognition
of private recreational uses under the riparian doctrine. The
second group of sections examines cases dealing with protecting mills from alterations in streamflows or reductions in
millwheel heads and with protecting municipal water supplies from reductions in flow. They involve protection of
nonrecreational instream uses; they are analyzed only for
their value as recognizing a right to protection of stream13.
(1967).

See, e.g., Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825

14.

See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 161 (1955); Parker v.

American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591, 81 N.E. 468 (1907); Merriwether v. City of
Worcester, 110 Mass. 216 (1872); Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161, (Mo. 1964).

While no one has counted the number of cases and jurisdictions emphasizing either
the natural flow theory or the reasonable use theory, a count of riparian rights cases
dealing with water pollution confirms the opinion that the reasonable use theory predominates. Davis, Theories of Water Pollution Litigation, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 738, 783,
app. A.
For a functional analysis of the reasonable use theory, see C. Davis, Introduction
to Water Law of the Eastern States, in 7 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 1, 36-52 (R.E.

Clark ed. 1976).
15. See, e.g., McCord v. Big Brothers Movement, 120 N.J. Eq. 446, 185 A. 480
(1936).
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flows. The third group of sections examines cases involving
protection of the waste assimilative capacity of streams as an
aspect of the riparian right to discharge wastes. The fourth
group of sections examines cases dealing with public rights
to protect streamflows for recreation, boating, natural
habitat, public water supply, and waste assimilation
purposes.
I. PROTECTION OF WATER LEVELS FOR
RECREATIONAL PURPOSES
Many riparian rights cases recognize a right of riparians
to use water for recreational purposes, such as fishing, swimming, and boating. Most of those cases involve the locational extent of the riparian's private right to use the surface
of a lake or watercourse for such purposes.' 6 A few of them,
however, deal with the protection of the level of the lake or
watercourse in order to make possible continued exercise of
that right. As it happens, most of the level protection cases
involve lakes; however, nothing in those cases'precludes applying the precedent to rivers, and one such case does involve a river.
In Collens v. New Canaan Water Co. ,17 the water company constructed a shallow well field along the bank of a
river. Its pumping operations dried up the river below the
wellfield and prevented plaintiff from continuing to boat and
fish in the river adjacent to his riparian land. Finding that
pumping from the wellfield was the equivalent of diverting
water from the river, the court enjoined the diversion. The
court held that the water company had no more right to divert the entire flow of the river than did any other riparian.
This case does not attempt to apportion the flow in the river
between the parties.
All the other cases deal with lake levels. Diversion of
16. See, e.g., Rice v. Namish, 8 Mich. App. 698, 155 N.W.2d 370 (1967); Snively
v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956).
A few jurisdictions deny riparians a right to use any portion of the surface except
over their own bed. See, e.g., Baker v. Normanock Ass'n, 25 N.J. 407, 136 A.2d 645
(1957).
17. 115 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967); also discussed infra at Section II.
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lake water occurs in three basic ways: (1) pumping water
out of the lake; (2) controlling the source of supply of that
lake, thereby preventing maintenance of the natural level;
and, (3) controlling an outlet so as to lower the level.
A. Diversion by Pumping Water from a Lake
Several cases have protected recreational lake levels
from encroachment by irrigation diversions. Two of these
cases are particularly significant because the injunctions
granted effected an allocation between the competing users,
thereby recognizing the validity of both uses. Harris v.
Brooks,' 8 a 1955 Arkansas case, involved a nonnavigable
lake from which the defendant pumped water for rice irrigation purposes. This pumping lowered the water level so as to
interfere with the plaintiffs recreational fishing boat rental
business. Below a certain level, access to plaintiffs boat
docks was impaired and fish ceased to bite. Therefore, the
plaintiff sought an injunction to prohibit the pumping to the
extent it adversely affected his business. The court granted
the injunction.
In so doing, the court adopted the reasonable use theory
and rejected the natural flow theory. It held that that theory
was necessitated by the progress of civilization and that the
purpose of the law 'is to secure to each riparian owner equality in the use of water as near as may be by requiring each to
exercise his right reasonably and with due regard to the
rights of others similarly situated."19
The Arkansas Supreme Court also enunciated four general rules or principles. They were: (1) the right to use water
for strictly domestic purposes is superior to other uses, such
as fishing, recreation, and irrigation; (2) except for domestic
use, all other lawful uses are of equal legal status; (3) a lawful use must yield or be enjoined if it destroys another lawful
use; and (4) in the event one use interferes with another, a
determination on a factual basis must be made whether that
use is unreasonable and should be enjoined or whether it is
18.
19.

225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
Id at 443, 283 S.W.2d at 133.
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reasonable and an equitable allocation should be made.2 °
The injunction granted by the court was especially significant. The court prohibited the irrigation diversion whenever the lake level fell below a specified level. That level
was selected because the evidence showed that recreational
fishing was significantly impaired below that level since fish
ceased to bite and access to the plaintiffs docks became very
difficult. Above that level, defendant irrigator was permitted
to divert his usual amount.2
Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co. 2 2 was a 1950 Florida case involving similar facts and a similar allocation. The plaintiff
used the lake for purely recreational purposes. It sought an
injunction to prevent the defendant from pumping water
from the lake during any dry season to irrigate his citrus
orchard. The Florida Supreme Court granted the injunction
on the ground that recreational uses are entitled to the same
protection from damage and destruction as are agricultural
uses. The irrigation pumping interferred with Tampa Coal's
recreational use. Therefore, it was enjoined during dry seasons when the lake fell below a specified level.
In 1969, the Florida Court of Appeals in Brown v. Ellingson 23 remanded a similar case for further proceedings.
The issue was whether the defendant had deprived the plaintiff of his reasonable use of the water for pleasure and recreation by pumping it for irrigation purposes. Once again
reasonable use and equality of uses were the doctrines applied. The court below was directed to ascertain whether the
irrigation diversion was unreasonably interfering with the
recreational use and, if so, to devise an apportionment.
The opposite result was reached in Lake Gibson Land
Co. v. Lester.24 Citing both Harris v. Brooks and Taylor v.
Tampa Coal Co., the Florida court found that the defendant,
who had lowered the lake level only 22/32 inch in irrigating
his citrus grove, had not interfered with the plaintiffs ripa20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id at 447, 283 S.W.2d at 134.
Id at 447, 283 S.W.2d at 135.
46 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1950).
224 So. 2d 391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
102 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
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rian rights. Applying the reasonable use theory the defendant's use was held to be permissible and injunctive relief was
denied.
The Michigan Supreme Court also has balanced the equities and decreed an apportionment. In Hoover v. Crane,25
the plaintiff alleged the defendant lowered the level six to
eight inches through his irrigation pumping. The defendant
contended he caused less than a 1/2-inch drop. The court
applied the reasonable use doctrine and allowed the defendant to pump only 1/4 inch of water whenever the lake
reached a stated level. Thus limited, diversion was
permitted.
All of these cases support the propositions that: (1) a
riparian is not entitled to maintenance of natural lake levels
or to a prohibition of consumptive diversions, and (2) a riparian diverter is not entitled to so much water that lake levels
are significantly lowered to the detriment of other riparians
making recreational uses of the water. Both propositions are
corollaries of the reasonable use theory of riparian rights.
Furthermore, the courts in these cases apportion the water
between the competing recreational and consumptive users
whenever they find that there is not enough water for both.
They allocate a minimum level of water in the lake which is
necessary to the continued exercise of the riparians' recreational use rights. All water above that level is made available for diversion by other riparians. In so doing, the courts
are selecting the instream flow users whenever it is forced to
select between users because there is sufficient water for only
one of them. Although the courts do not say so, they are
reaching results which create a natural flow minimum water
level which is not subject to encroachment by diverters making otherwise reasonable uses.
B.

Dversion by Controlling a Lake's Source of Water

The water level of a lake can be controlled through the
diversion of the waters which feed that lake. By diverting
this water before it enters the lake, a riparian proprietor can
25.

362 Mich. 36, 106 N.W.2d 563 (1960).
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have a substantial impact on the lake's water level. In Bouris
v. Largent,26 the Illinois Court of Appeals found that the
construction of a dam between two lakes resulted in raising
the upper lake and lowering the lower lake. It found that to
be an unreasonable use. Plaintiff as a riparian was entitled
to the natural flow of the water and the dam unreasonably
interfered with such right. Accordingly, maintenance of the
dam was enjoined.
The same result was reached in Dardenne Realty Co. v.
Abeken,2 a 1937 Missouri case. There a mandatory injunction was granted ordering the defendant to remove a dam
along a creek which fed plaintiff's lake and to stop diverting
water above the dam. The injunction prohibited interference with or diminution in the natural flow of any water into
the lake except that used for domestic purposes.
These cases purport to follow the natural flow theory of
riparian rights which does not allow any sensible diminution
of flow or water levels. It seems odd that courts would allocate water between instream and consumptive users when
the diversion is from the lake itself but would prohibit diversions altogether if the diversion is from the source of the
lake. Perhaps that is more an apparent inconsistency than a
real one. The diversions in the lake source diversion cases
may have been large enough to lower the lake levels below
those which the courts found unreasonable in the lake diversion cases. However, the cases do not contain enough water
level data to ascertain whether that supposition is correct.
Hence, it cannot be determined whether the choice of theory
created a different result, or whether the same result would
have been reached under the reasonable use theory employed in the lake diversion cases.
In any event, the selection of the natural flow theory in
these cases no longer is viable precedent. It never was in
Illinois, that state has followed the reasonable use theory in
diversion cases since 1842.28 Missouri definitively rejected
the natural flow theory and expressly adopted the reasonable
26.
27.

94 I11.App. 2d 251, 236 N.E.2d 15 (1968).
232 Mo. App. 945, 106 S.W.2d 966 (1937).

28.

Evans v. Merriwether, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 492 (1842).
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.use theory in 1964.29
C.

Diversion by Controlling an Outlet of a Lake

A riparian owner can likewise affect a lake's water level
if he controls a dam at the lake's natural outlet. Numerous
cases involve the situation in which one riparian has maintained such a dam for a long period of time. As a result of
the higher or more stable water level, lakefront property
owners have developed cottages or profitable resorts. The
dam owner eventually wants to lower the water level and the
lakefront owners go into court seeking injunctive relief to
prevent the lowering of the lake to its previous natural level.
This discussion involves a different type of case than
those discussed previously. None of these cases involve a
consumptive diversion which affects water levels. Hence, allocation between users is not involved. Instead, two situations are involved. The first is a conflict between the
recreational user riparians on an artificially raised natural
watercourse and the dam owner who is using the dam pool
for hydro-electric power production. The conflict arises
from frequent changes in pool level caused by peak power
production which interferes with recreational boat docks.
The second situation is permanent abandonment and removal of dams.
1. Frequent Changes in Reservoir Level
Three cases have dealt with conflicts between recreational user riparians who seek stable water levels and hydroelectric dam owners who seek to change reservoir levels for
peak power production. In Hammond v. Antwerp Light &
Power Co. ,3"the defendant had raised and lowered the lake
level for sixty years. The plaintiffs were owners of a summer
home who had enjoyed boating and fishing on the lake.
They were seeking curtailment of the degree to which the
defendant could exercise control over the lake level. The de29. Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964). This case confirmed in
Ripka v. Wansing, 589 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. 1979).
30. 132 Misc. 786, 230 N.Y.S. 621 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1928).
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fendant claimed a right by prescription. The court found
that the plaintiffs had acquired reciprocal prescriptive easements to have the same approximate level maintained. The
defendant was equitably estopped to go beyond those limits.
An injunction was granted setting the limits of diversion to
those which occurred for at least the duration of the statute
of limitations; the greater fluctuations of lesser duration were
enjoined.
CedarLake Hotel Co. v. CedarLake Hydraulic Co. 3, enjoined the frequent lowering of the lake level by a dam owner to the detriment of resort owners. The ground for the
injunction, however, was that the defendant's actions constituted continuing private nuisance.
The State of New Hampshire, acting on behalf of the
public, sought an injunction against defendant's lowering
the lake level for power production in State v. Great Falls
Manufacturing Co. 32 The Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to use the water in a reasonable manner. The factual question of whether the defendant's use
was reasonable was answered affirmatively.
Each of these three cases employs a different theory for
granting the injunctions against substantial and frequent
variations in reservoir level. While no consistent theory has
been applied in these cases, their consistent result suggests
that varying a reservoir level substantially for peak power
production is unlawful because it unreasonably impinges on
the ability of riparians to exercise their recreational use
rights. The fluctuation which the courts will allow appears
to be a function of the boating facilities which are established on the reservoir and maintained for long periods of
time without objection by the dam owner.
Because of the lack of clarity of the law in this area,
most power dam owners protect themselves by obtaining fee
simple title to the bed of the reservoir, a fringe around it that
is likely to be flooded with any frequency, and an additional
dryland fringe beyond that. This renders all landowners
31.

79 Wis. 297, 48 N.W. 371 (1891).

32.

76 N.H. 373, 83 A. 126 (1912).
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around the reservoir nonriparians who have no right to any
particular reservoir level. Their use of the reservoir surface
would be as members of the public. Their placing of docks
in the reservoir would be as lessees or licenses of the power
dam owner; their rights can be made expressly subject to reservoir level fluctuations deemed necessary by the power dam
owner.
2.

Abandonment and Removal of Dams

The courts are divided whether a dam owner can drain
a reservoir, remove the dam, and restore the prior natural
watercourse level when maintenance of the dam becomes
uneconomic to its owner. This creates a severe hardship for
cottage owners who have relied on the artificial level.
(a) Right to Reservoir Level Upheld

The majority of courts appear to side with the lakefront
resort owners. Kray v. Muggli33 is a leading case. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted an injunction against the
dam owner's taking any affirmative steps to remove his dam.
The court's opinion spoke in terms of reciprocal easements.
The defendant had obtained prescriptive rights against the
plaintiff's when he constructed and maintained the dam.
This rule was held to be reciprocal so that the resort owners
now had a right to the continued water level. The court
ruled that one who has impounded water for a period beyond the statute of limitations cannot later be permitted to
restore it to its original state if that would have the effect of
destroying or materially injuring the property adjacent to the
lake. The reciprocal right was not simply a personal one,
34
but a right appurtenant and incident to the land itself.
Under similar facts, the Wisconsin court in Smith v. Youmans 35 enjoined the dam owner from lowering the level to
the detriment of resort owners on the ground that the plaintiffs had acquired reciprocal prescriptive easements.
Missouri has reached the same result in a dam aban33. 84 Minn. 90, 86 N.W. 882 (1901).
34. Id at 97, 86 N.W. at 884.
35. 96 Wis. 103, 70 N.W. 1115 (1897).
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donment case. Geisinger v. Klinhardt36 was a case in which
the lower owner sought to partially drain the lake by means
of his dam. The lake was created by a country club which
owned the lake bed and all the surrounding land. Plaintiff
bought the land around the upper end of the lake and defendant bought the dam site. Dam repairs had been paid for
by subscriptions from the public. An injunction was granted
on the theory of an implied easement because, at the time
plaintiff acquired the land, the lake, although an artificial
one, was appurtenant and necessary to the proper enjoyment
of the premises as a lake lot. Plaintiffs easement to the lake
level was reciprocal to defendant's flooding easement since
the value of the land for both of them depended upon maintenance of the lake. The court concluded that the plaintiff in
purchasing the land had acquired the implied right to have
had
the lake maintained at its usual level and the defendant
37
lake.
the
drain
or
waters
the
lower
to
no right
(b) Right to Reservoir Level Denied
A few cases have denied to recreational use riparians
the right to have an artificial reservoir level maintained
when the dam owner seeks to abandon and remove it. In
1958, the Rhode Island Supreme Court flatly rejected the
notion of reciprocal easements in Hood v. Slefkin.38 It held
that the lakefront riparian owners had no reciprocal easements to have the dam maintained or the water level preserved. A right to maintenance of the dam did not stem
from riparian rights.
The Nebraska Supreme Court went even further in
1966. Kiwanis Club Foundation,Inc. v. Yost 39 denied the upper riparian owners any right to the maintenance of defendant's dam. The court held:
[W]here a dam has been built for the private convenience and advantage of the owner, he is not required to
maintain and operate it for the benefit of an upper ripa36.

321 Mo. 186, 9 S.W.2d 978 (1928).

37. Id at 198, 9 S.W.2d at 983.
38. 143 A.2d 683 (R.I. 1958).
39. 179 Neb. 598, 139 N.w.2d 359 (1966).
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rian proprietor who obtains advantages from its existence; and the construction and maintenance of such a
dam does not create any reciprocal rights in upstream
riparian proprietors based on prescription, dedication, or
estoppel.
The owner of a dam and the prescriptive rights to
overflow the land of upper riparian owners may abandon his rights [sic], and may also return the river to its
natural state by removing or destroying the dam.40
(c)

Discussion
The dam abandonment cases have no consistent theory
to explain their differences in result. Indeed, the fact situations in all of the cases appear to be similar. The differences
in result, then, are the result of the application of different
legal theories and the different policy attitudes which lie behind those theories. The basic policy question is whether the
builder of a dam is constructing it for posterity or only for
his own economic purposes. A subsidiary question is
whether a dam owner should be permitted to argue that a
dam is a temporary structure when it has the appearance of
permanence and when substantial recreational investments
are made by surrounding landowners because of that appearance of permanence and where the dam owner has done
little or nothing to deter recreational development in reliance on the dam's existence. The smorgasbord of legal theories resulting from these cases are but a reflection of the fact
that the riparian doctrine itself does not suggest answers to
these questions and that no other legal theory is obviously
applicable. Since no legal theory propounded by a court in
these cases is legally rational, courts have kept looking for a
better theory to reach an appropriate policy result. The decisions in these cases demonstrate that courts tend to prefer an
appropriate policy result to legal rationality if they are
forced to choose between them.
3.

Draining of a Natural Lake
While the courts are divided whether an artificially
40. Id at 602, 139 N.W.2d at 361.
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raised natural watercourse can be restored to its prior natural level, they are much more certain that natural lakes cannot be drained to the disadvantage of abutting riparians.
That is an obvious violation of riparian rights, whether it is
considered a deprivation of natural flow or a taking of an
unreasonable proportion of the flow.
Bohannon v. Camden Bend Drainage District 4 ' involved

draining of a private lake as part of a drainage project. The
Missouri Court of Appeals held that by taking the water
from the lake the defendant would be depriving plaintiff of
his riparian property without due process of law. Since defendant was a public agency and could not be enjoined, the
court found that a cause of action was stated for inverse
condemnation.
D. Discussion
Most courts apply the reasonable use theory of riparian
rights to conflicts involving private recreational uses by riparians where lowered lake levels threaten to impair that
use. They tend to consider a certain minimum level to be
protected from encroachment by consumptive diversions. In
that sense instream recreational uses are preferred over diversionary uses and instream power uses. However, those
minimum levels tend to be set so that they become operative
only during droughts or late summer low flow periods. During the rest of the time, instream recreational uses must
share the surplus flow or water level with the consumptive
diversionary or instream power uses.
A few courts, instead, have applied the natural flow theory or other theories, such as private nuisance, estoppel, reciprocal prescriptive easements, and the like, to protect
instream recreational uses. This is true most prominantly in
dam abandonment cases. With few exceptions, however,
most of those cases probably would have been decided the
same way under the reasonable use theory.
The dam abandonment cases present a particularly difficult problem under the reasonable use theory, because they
41.

240 Mo. App. 492, 208 S.W.2d 794 (1948).
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are the only ones where a riparian desires to terminate a use
rather than begin one. It is a little hard to hold that cessation of a use itself constitutes an unreasonable use, because
the theory speaks in terms of affirmative uses. Nonetheless
the courts tend to protect instream recreational uses even
then by finding some theory which requires a continuation
of a long-standing artificial condition. It is as if the courts
consider the artificially raised natural watercourse to have
become the natural watercourse through long use.
It is clear that instream recreational uses are a recognized riparian use and that they enjoy equal status with consumptive diversionary uses. Unlike the latter uses, however,
they need not share the available water resources regardless
of the degree of water shortage. When the water supply
reaches a certain minimum level, instream uses in general
are preferred to diversionary ones. This is particularly true
of instream recreational uses.
II. PROTECTION OF FLOWS IN WATERCOURSES
In flowing watercourses, as distinguished from lakes,
protection of streamflows becomes important principally in
protecting instream recreational and natural habitat uses.
While maintenance of stream levels is important, it is directly dependent on the volume of water flowing in the
stream. Hence, cases involving watercourses tend to deal
with streamflows rather than water levels. This is true even
of mill cases where protection of maximum head is all
important.
Diversions and instream uses on watercourses are governed by the riparian rights doctrine in the Eastern states.
The nature of the riparian right has been discussed previously. The doctrine applies only to watercourses, and not to
occasional unconfined flows resulting from rains or
snowmelts. A watercourse is a running stream of water
which has a bed, banks, and channel, and which flows perennially, although not necessarily continuously. 42 In hydro42. See, e.g., Benson v. Chicago & A.R.R., 78 Mo. 504 (1883); Hoyt v. City of
Hudson, 27 Wis. 656 (1871).
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logic terms, although not so expressed by courts of law,
watercourses have a base flow derived from groundwater
supplies and are not dependent on diffused surface water after rains or snowmelts alone to maintain flow.
With one exception, Collens v. New Canaan Water
Co. '3 there are no cases involving a conflict between an instream recreational use and a consumptive diversionary use.
Also, there are no cases involving an instream fish and wildlife habitat use. Hence, an examination of other types of
cases involving protection of streamflows must be resorted to
for possible analogous precedents.
Collens v. New Canaan Water Co. 44 involved a streamside wellfield diversion of the entire flow of a river for a public water supply. A downstream riparian was deprived of his
boating swimming and fishing uses. The court held that diversion to be excessive and enjoined it. In the discussion in
section I, this case was characterized as a level reduction
case where drying up the stream was held unreasonable.
The same can be said if it were characterized as a flow reduction case. In no event is a riparian entitled to take the
entire flow of a stream, since the riparians below are entitled
to a portion of the flow. The decision, however, does not
apportion the water between the conflicting users, but
merely enjoins the diversion of the whole of the streamflow.
Most riparian rights cases involve conflicts between
diverters. In general the courts apportion the water between
conflicting users proportionately to their respective needs,
taking into account their locations, relation of diversion to
total streamflow, and degree of consumptiveness of the diversions. The only preferred uses are domestic uses, whose
needs are satisfied ahead of all other uses.45
Since there are no other instream recreational use cases
besides Collens, an examination of other types of instream
use cases is in order. The predominant instream use situa43.
44.

115 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967). See also supra Section I.
Id

45. See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955) (dictum);
Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. 2d 549, 150 P.2d 405 (1944); Evans v. Merriwether, 4 111. (3
Scam.) 492 (1842) (dictum).
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tion is the conflict between two mills or between a mill and a
consumptive diversion. Mills depend on stable streamflows,
stable millpond levels, and stable tailrace levels to generate
water power. Mills, and their modern equivalent, hydroelectric power dams, have been involved in numerous lawsuits. The following discussion of mill cases is presented for
what learning may be applicable to instream recreational
and wildlife habitat uses.
A.

Need for Stable Water Flow or Level-Mills

Almost all the mill cases involve variations of the same
factual situation: a millowner bringing suit against an upper
riparian proprietor who is either himself building or altering
a dam to be used in conjunction with a mill or who is diverting the water for some other purpose. The upper riparian is
disturbing the natural or accustomed flow of the watercourse
in a conflicting manner and the lower riparian mill owner is
seeking to have the conduct enjoined.
Four theories have been employed in mill cases. The
choice of theory does affect the result in some situations.
The first theory is an early form of prescription. Mills which
have operated without restraint for the period of the statute
of limitations are entitled to continue operating without interference by conflicting mills or diversions. This is true
even if the first mill's use of water did not adversely affect
any other riparian's use. This prescription theory is based,
then, on long use. Several early cases have subscribed to this
theory.4 6 Since the theory has been applied only to mills, and
46.

See Colburn v. Richards, 13 Mass. 420 (1816).

The court allowed a lower

millowner who had depended on the flow of a stream for many years to enter plaintiffs land and to remove the gate from plaintiffs newly repaired dam. Although
plaintiff intended to make an irrigation diversion, he was nonsuited in an action for
trespass because defendant millowner had acquired a right to the flow by long user.
The court held, therefore, that he was justified in using self-help to remove the obstruction.
It should be noted that this decision was made before the riparian doctrine was

formulated in 1827, see supra note 8, and at a time when water use rights in general
were considered to be based on long user. See generally Lauer, Common Law Backgroundof the Riparian Doctrine, 28 Mo. L. REv. 60 (1963).

For other cases following long user, see Buddington v. Bradley, 10 Conn.
213 (1834); Stickler v. Todd, 10 Serg. & Rawle 63 (Pa. 1823) (later implicitly over-
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not to other types of riparian uses, and since long user as a
basis for prescription was replaced by a requirement for adverse use by the middle of the nineteenth century, it is unlikely that the long user prescription theory would be
applied to protect recreational and natural habitat
streamflows.
The second theory is even less likely to be applied to
non-mill uses. It is the prior use doctrine. It provides that
the earlier mill is to be preferred over later mills or other
later uses regardless of the duration of the first use.47 It is a
rule not unlike the prior appropriation doctrine of the western United States. Prior use was expressly rejected by many
courts as the basis for water use rights with the advent of the
riparian rights doctrine.48 However, in the case of mills and
hydro-electric power dams, it retains life in some jurisdictions. 9 Since it has been rejected as the general basis for
water use rights, it is unlikely that the prior use theory would
be applied to protect recreational and natural habitat
streamflows. Furthermore, by its terms the doctrine would
be useless against diversionary uses established prior to instream uses. The third and fourth theories, the natural flow
and reasonable use theories of riparian rights, are applied to
mills today and have usefulness for protecting other instream flow uses besides mills.

1. Cases Applying the Natural Flow Theory
Roberts v. Martin,"° Parker v. Griswold,5' White P. East
Lake Land Co. ,2 Chestatee Pyrites Co. v. Cavenders Creek
ruled in favor of riparian rights); Farrell v. Richards, 30 N.J. Eq. 511 (Ch. 1879);
Saunders v. Newman, 1 B. & Ad. 258, 106 Eng. Rep. 95 (K.B. 1818); Wood v. Waud,
3 Ex. 748, 154 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1849).

47.

See, e.g., Wentworth v. Poor, 38 Me. 243 (1854); Heath v. Williams, 25 Me.

209 (1845); Mowry v. Sheldon, 2 R.I. 369 (1852).

48. See Lauer, supra note 46. This prior use concept was expressly rejected in
Tyler P. Wilkinson, the original riparian rights case. See supra note 8.
49. Harp v. Iowa Falls Elec. Co., 196 Iowa 317, 191 N.W. 520 (1923); McIntosh
v. Rankin, 134 Mo. 340, 35 S.W. 995 (1896).
50. 72 W. Va. 92, 77 S.E. 535 (1913).
51. 17 Conn. 288 (1845).
52.

96 Ga. 415, 23 S.E. 393 (1895).
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Gold Mining Co. ,53 Stock v. Jefferson Townshop, 54 Robertson
v. Arnold,55 and Samuels v. Armstrong5 6 are all cases in

which the court found that the plaintiff was not being actually damaged as a result of the defendant's diversion. Nevertheless, an injunction was granted and nominal damages
were awarded in each case.
The rationale is the same in all the cases. The right to
the natural flow of the stream is a property right annexed to
the soil. Diversion of the water is an infringement of a riparian right. It makes no difference whether the plaintiff suffers actual damage or whether he needs the water for his
own use. "The necessities of one man's business cannot be
the standard of another's rights. ' 57 The use is an injury because the plaintiff might lose the right to divert at some later
date through prescription and because every legal injury imparts damage. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction
against the diversion to prevent the defendant from obtaining any adverse rights to the flow through prescription,
and to nominal damages. Allowing the injunction also prevents a multiplicity of suits otherwise required to toll the
statute of limitations.
A riparian's obligation not to diminish the flow in a watercourse to the injury of a mill is not excused by acts of
third persons or apparent acquiescence by the injured riparian. In Stein v. Burden,58 defendant diverted the entire flow

above plaintiffs mill. Although defendant had constructed a
ditch to return the water to the stream, a third party prevented the water's return by diverting part of the flow from
this ditch. The court held that under his natural flow obligations defendant had the duty to return all the waters he diverted except that used for domestic purposes. He diverted
the water at his own risk. Liability rested on his failure to
return the water, not on the reasons why he did not return it.
53.

118 Ga. 255, 45 S.E. 267 (1903).

54.

114 Mich. 357, 72 N.W. 132 (1897).

55.
56.

182 Ga. 664, 186 S.E. 806 (1936).
46 Misc. 481, 93 N.Y.S. 24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1905).

57.
58.

Wheatley v. Chrisman, 24 Pa. 298, 302 (1855).
29 Ala. 127 (1856).
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The fact that defendant had no control over the third party
was held irrelevant.
Another case showing strong support for natural flow
rights was New York Rubber Co. v. Rothery.5 9 The plaintiffs
predecessor in title had stood by and silently watched defendants construct a millrace with which to divert a substantial amount of the stream flow from the former's mill.
Plaintiff then sought to enjoin the diversion. Defendant
claimed the defense of estoppel-since no objection had
been made while defendant was building the structure, no
objection could be made now as to its use. The court disagreed. It held that since plaintiffs predecessor had no duty
to speak, estoppel would not apply absent fraud or misleading statements. Mere silence did not constitute such fraud.
Since the elements for estoppel were missing, the court held
that plaintiffs natural flow rights were enforceable and issued the injunction.
These nine cases stand for one or the other of two propositions. The first was applied specifically. The natural
flow theory of riparian rights is preferred. No riparian may
take or alter the flow of a watercourse so that it is either
sensibly or materially diminished when it reaches the lower
riparian. Injury is not the gravamen of the cause of action,
flow alteration or reduction is. The second proposition is
implied. It stems from the fact that most of these cases were
decided in the nineteenth century shortly after the long user
and prior user theories fell out of favor. Mills enjoy a special status on watercourses. Flow of water to a prior mill
cannot be encroached upon to its injury, even though flows
to other types of riparian users may be subject to flow diminution for reasonable uses by other riparians. The natural
flow theory protects mills from flow alterations and diminutions by later mills and other diversionary uses. Selection of
the natural flow theory of riparian rights allowed substitution of a more modern legal theory without altering the legal
result.
59.

107 N.Y. 310, 14 N.E. 269 (1887).
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Cases Applying the Reasonable Use Theory

Other jurisdictions, however, apply the fourth theory,
reasonable use, to mills. Bollinger v. Henry,60 a 1964 Missouri case, refused to enjoin a diversion from plaintiff's millrace. Plaintiff operated his mill only one day per week.
Defendant used the water for irrigation. The court held that
defendant was entitled to reasonable use of the water and
plaintiff was not entitled to the entire flow, particularly since
he needed so little of it. The court seemed to balance the
equities and reach the conclusion that, in light of the circumstances, defendant's use was reasonable. Scott v. Slaughter,6'
a 1963 Arkansas case, also applied the reasonable use doctrine. The case involved two riparians, both using a stream
for commercial hunting and fishing purposes. The upper riparian built three dams which reduced the flow of the
stream. Finding that obstruction to be an unreasonable use,
the court ordered the defendant to lower two of his three
dams.
North Alabama Coal,Iron & Railway Co. v. Jones62 and
Hartzallv. Sill 63 involved upper riparians constructing dams

which affected the flow to lower millowners. Pitts v. Lancaster Mills64 and Davis v. Getchel 65 both concerned dams

which had been in operation above plaintiff millowners for
some time. The doctrinal basis for the decisions in all four
cases was the same. The courts held that every riparian has
the right to use the water even though that use diminishes
the flow and thus reduces the water level, so long as that use
is reasonable. The test for reasonableness is a factual one
depending on circumstances such as the width and depth of
the stream bed, the volume and fall of the water, previous
usage, and the state of improvement in the manufactories
and useful arts developed along the stream's banks.66 In
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964).
237 Ark. 457, 373 S.W.2d 577 (1963).
156 Ala. 360, 47 So. 144 (1908).
12 Pa. 248 (1849).
54 Mass. 156 (1847).
50 Me. 602 (1862).
Pitts v. Lancaster Mills, 54 Mass. 156, 158 (1847).
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each of the four cases the court found that the defendant's
use was a reasonable one. Therefore, the courts held that
any injury plaintiffs suffered was merely damnum absque injuria and denied injunctive relief.
Although couched in somewhat different terms, the
same conclusion was reached in Harrisv. Norfolk & Western
Railway.67 The case involved a different fact situation. The
railroad pumped water from the river for its locomotives,
permanently lowering the water level by the amounts withdrawn. This use was in contrast to mills on the stream which
merely affected the continuity of the flow, and thus the water
level, but not the overall amount of water in the stream. The
North Carolina Supreme Court spoke in terms of the degree
of injury. Every riparian is entitled to flow without material
diminution. No riparian has the right to use the water so as
to inflict substantial injury upon those below. The diversion
by the railroad was held to be permissible because there was
no appreciable, perceptible diminution in volume.
Occasionally the doctrine of reasonable use has been
68
utilized to enjoin a diverting riparian. In Timm v. Bear
and Dilling v. Murray,6 9 the upper riparians were operating
dams or water wheels too large for the size of the river. Consequently, the water had to be dammed back in large quantities for extended periods. The courts held that because the
works were unsuited to the nature of the watercourse the diversions were unreasonable. Therefore, injunctions against
the diversions were granted.
The foregoing nine cases hold that a diversion resulting
in a lowered or disrupted water flow is a legitimate use so
long as that use is reasonable and the effect on other riparian
uses is not unreasonable. Reasonableness turned upon a
factual analysis of the particular case at bar. Those cases,
although involving mills, follow the general run of riparian
rights cases involving conflicts between diverters. They refuse to accord special status to mills.
67.
68.
69.

153 N.C. 542, 69 S.E. 623 (1910).
29 Wis. 254 (1871).
6 Ind. 324 (1855).
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Special Situations

Occasionally special circumstances are involved in a
case which change the legal result from that expected under
the general rule. This is true in mill cases, too. The following four special situations involve rules applied in water allocation cases generally. The examples described all involve
mills.
(a) NonriparianDiversions
Uses outside the watershed generally are held to violate
riparian rights. Anderson v. CincinnatiSouthern Railway70
was another railroad case. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
reversed a decision for the railroad and remanded the case to
the trial court for a factual determination as to damages.
The appellate court held that the pumping of water for use
in locomotives would be unreasonable if the millowner was
materially damaged as a result, since it removed water from
the watercourse. A similar diversion was found to be potentially unreasonable in Stratton v. Mount Hermon Boys'
School.7 There the defendant diverted the water to its
school grounds which were in a different watershed. The
court held that a diversion out of the watershed or to noncontiguous land was potentially unreasonable. The only
question then remaining was whether there was actual injury
to the lower riparian in his reasonable use of the water. If
so, relief was warranted. The court remanded the case for
further deliberations on the actual injury question.
But a few jurisdictions disagree and permit nonriparian
diversion even if a lower riparian is adversely affected, provided the diminution in flow is not unreasonable. Defendant diverted water and sold it to nonriparians in Gillis v.
Chase.12 The well-established English rule in other states
was that any use by nonriparians was per se unreasonable.
New Hampshire, however, adopted a minority rule and permitted the nonriparian use. The court held that reasonable70.

86 Ky. 44, 5 S.W. 49 (1887).

71.
72.

216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913).
67 N.H. 161, 31 A.18 (1891).
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ness was a question of fact depending on all relevant
circumstances and the location of use was not solely
determinative.
(b) Malicious Diversions
Diversions for the purpose of injuring a neighboring riparian are unlawful. Fulton County Gas & Electric Co. v.
Rockwood Manufacturing Co. 73 involved willful and malicious conduct. The defendant increased the capacity of his
dam so as to further disrupt the operation of plaintiffs mill
situated below him. The court held the defendant's conduct
was malicious and wanton and enjoined it as a wrongful interference with the plaintiffs riparian rights.
(c) Prescription
The right to engage in otherwise unlawful diversions
can be acquired by prescription. In Lancaster Milling Co. v.
Media Heights Golf Club, 74 defendant had diverted water for
approximately forty years to irrigate its greens and tees. The
court held that it had acquired a prescriptive right against a
downstream millowner to the amount of water it had diverted for the prescriptive period defined by the statute of
limitations, but only to the extent that diversion was adverse
to plaintiff and not in exercise of defendant's riparian rights.
Hence, it denied defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
(d) Estoppel
Otherwise unlawful diversions can be made lawful by
failure of the affected riparian to object in a timely fashion.
Estoppel was invoked in both Southern Marble Co. v.
Darnell" and Payne v. Paddock.76 In the former case, the
plaintiff had worked for and been paid by the defendant for
constructing the diversionary ditch. The court found that
the plaintiff knew or should have known of its intended use.
73.
74.
75.
76.

205 A.D. 787, 200 N.Y.S. 225 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1923).
59 Lanc. Rev. 159 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
94 Ga. 231, 21 S.E. 531 (1894).
Walker's Ch. 487 (Mich. 1844).
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Since it did not object at that time, it was estopped from
doing so after the defendant completed the ditch. In the latter case, the plaintiffs orally promised to allow the defendant
to divert lake water. Then, after the defendant had expended $3,000, they gave him written notice forbidding the
diversion. The appellate court refused to enjoin the diversion invoking the maxim, "He who seeks equity must do equity." Since the plaintiffs had allowed the defendant to
spend a large sum in reliance on their oral promise, they
could not now be heard to complain.
B. Summary
Courts have taken positions at both ends of the legal
spectrum regarding a riparian owner's right to enjoy the undiminished, uninterrupted flow of a watercourse. While
some tribunals have granted relief even in the absence of
damage, other courts judge the diversion in terms of its comparative reasonableness. They take into consideration both
the nature of the users along the watercourse and the nature
of the stream itself. In view of the tendency of today's courts
to apply the reasonable use doctrine to diversion cases, this
last group of cases probably is the most indicative of the judiciary's future response in instream flow cases.
The recent mill cases do not suggest that level and flow
maintenance will be accorded any special status against diversions. However, the few lake diversion cases decided in
the past 30 years do suggest that recreational instream uses
will be afforded minimum water levels free from encroachments by diversions. Those two trends suggest that mills
and hydro-electric dams are now being treated like any other
non-domestic riparian use, while instream recreational users
are beginning to be guaranteed a minimum water level and a
portion of streamflows. The cases are too few to predict
what portion of streamflow will be allocated to recreational
uses.
Throughout the development of riparian rights law, the
courts in the eastern states have not addressed water needs
for natural habitat. Hence, there is no way of knowing
whether the courts would protect, for example, a private
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swamp for waterfowl from destruction by upstream
diversions.
III.

MAINTENANCE OF WASTE ASSIMILATIVE
CAPACITY

Analysis of eastern common law stream pollution cases
suggests strongly that a riparian has a right to discharge
wastes to a reasonable extent. Since riparians have a right to
make reasonable uses of water, which are defined as those
which do not unreasonably injure other riparians, it should
not come as a surprise that riparians have a corresponding
right to discharge wastes. A riparian may discharge wastes
into a surface stream provided those wastes neither interfere
with uses of water by other riparians to an unreasonable extent 77 nor create a private 78 or public 79 nuisance. An unreasonable discharge of wastes has been defined as one causing
an appreciable or substantial injury, as distinguished from a
slight inconvenience or occasional annoyance.80 While the
view of PennsylvaniaCoal Co. v. Sanderson and Wg4e 8 that a
miner can pollute a stream with acid mine drainage without
8 2
liability has been thoroughly discredited and repudiated,
the case law has not gone so far as to prohibit waste discharges altogether.8 3 The right to discharge wastes has been
77. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Firmenich Mfg. Co., 77 Iowa 576, 42 N.W. 448 (1889);
Joplin Consol. Mining Co. v. City of Joplin, 124 Mo. 129, 27 S.W. 406 (1894); Dwinel
v. Veazie, 44 Me. 167 (1857); City of Cape Girardeau v. Hunze, 314 Mo. 438, 284
S.W. 471 (1926). See also Davis, supra note 14, at 748, 753, 780.
78. See, e.g., Bowman v. Humphrey, 124 Iowa 744, 100 N.W. 854 (1904); Bartlett v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 351 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Davis,
supra note 14, at 750, 780, app. B at 793-800; Trevett v. Prison Ass'n, 98 Va. 332, 36
S.E. 373 (1900).
79. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wear v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co., 204 S.W. 942
(Mo. Ct. App. 1918); Davis, supra note 14, at 741.
80. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Hamilton, 100 Ala. 252, 14 So. 167
(1893); Tetherington v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co., 232 I11. 522, 83 N.E. 1048
(1908); Muncie Pulp Co. v. Koontz, 33 Ind. App. 532, 70 N.E. 999 (1904); Snow v.
Parsons, 28 Vt. 459 (1856). See also Davis, supra note 14, at 747 n.33.
81. 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886).
82. See, e.g.., Parker v. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591, 81 N.E. 468
(1907).
83. This is a natural flow concept which has been rejected with respect to diversions for well over 100 years. But see cases cited infra note 87.
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sustained in not less than 30 cases, all grounded upon reasonable use concepts and not involving apparent nuisances. 4 That right has been recognized expressly in five of
those decisions.85 Only one case has rejected the notion,86
and that one, perforce, was decided contrary to the reasonable use doctrine it expressly affirms.
However, the courts are not uniformly agreed that there
is a riparian right to discharge wastes to a reasonable degree.
A minority of courts reject that notion, clinging to the
natural flow concept that streamflows cannot be altered perceptibly or sensibly in quantity or quality. Some 14 decisions, not involving apparent nuisances, have so held.87
No riparian, even under the reasonable use concept, can
discharge wastes in circumstances where a private or public
nuisance is created.18 A private nuisance is defined as a nontrespassory interference with the use or enjoyment of a
neighbor's land. 9 Water pollution most often constitutes a
private nuisance when it creates odors interfering with
places of habitation or work, poisons domestic or livestock
water supplies, or destroys the fertility of the soil.90 Generally, interferences with industrial processes are held not to
constitute private nuisances. 91 The courts are split whether
interferences with irrigation constitute private nuisances.92
Public nuisances are interferences with public health or
safety.93 Water pollution constitutes a public nuisance most
often when odors abound in residential areas, or public, do84.

Davis, supra note 14, at 748 n.35, app. A at 786-89.

85. Donnelly Brick Co. v. City of New Britain, 106 Conn. 167, 137 A. 745 (1927)
(stated negatively); Ferguson v. Firmenich Mfg. Co., 77 Iowa 576, 42 N.W. 448
(1889); Dwinel v. Veazie, 44 Me. 167, 69 A.D. 94 (1857); Hayes v. Waldron, 44 N.H.
580, 84 A.D. 105 (1863); George v. Village of Chester, 59 Misc. 553, 111 N.Y.S. 722
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1908), aff'dmem., 137 A.D. 889, 121 N.Y.S. 1131 (1910), modifted, 202

N.Y. 398, 95 N.E. 767 (1911).
86. Auger & Simon Silk Dyeing Co. v. East Jersey Water Co., 88 N.J.L. 273, 96
A, 60, aft'd, 88 N.J.L. 368, 96 A. 62 (1915).
87. Davis, supra note 14, at 746 n.29, app. A at 783-84.
88. Davis, supra note 14, at 749-50. See supra notes 72-73.
89. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 89, at 591, 594 (4th ed. 1971).

90. Davis, supra note 14, at 749-50, 753, app. D, table 2 at 806, app. B at 793-801.
91. Id
92. Id
93.

W. PROSSER, TORTS § 88, at 583 (4th ed. 1971).
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mestic or livestock water supplies are poisoned.94 Public
nuisances may be abated by litigation either by public officials or specially damaged private individuals. 9
If a riparian has a right to discharge wastes to a reasonable extent, there are two ways the courts would be expected
to recognize and enforce that right. First, courts could refuse
to abate waste discharges which do not unreasonably interfere with uses by other riparians. That is the usual fact situation in the typical water pollution case not involving
nuisances. Second, courts could abate diversions upstream
from the waste discharger which would reduce the flow of
the watercourse and reduce the dilution of downstream
waste discharges so that other riparians would become injured by the waste discharges for the first time. If a waste
discharge is a reasonable use, it should be free from upstream interferences as well as downstream complaints.
There is only one case in the United States which deals with
that second type of fact situation. In Auger & Simon Silk
Dyeing Co. v. East Jersey Water Co.,96 two New Jersey
courts rejected the argument that an upstream public water
supply diverter could not divert water in order that a downstream waste discharger could continue to rely on the river's
assimilative capacity to avoid unreasonable interferences
downstream. Unfortunately, the courts expressly rejected
the majority notion of the riparian right to discharge wastes
to a reasonable extent. 97 Furthermore, the lower court suggested that the waste discharge was so polluting that it might
constitute a public nuisance. 98 Hence, that decision is of no
value in ascertaining whether majority rule courts would
protect the waste assimilative capacity of a river for use by
waste dischargers in a case with the proper set of facts.
Nonetheless, the concept of a riparian right to discharge
wastes to a reasonable extent would seem to require court
protection of waste assimilative capacity in appropriate
94. Davis, suprc note 14, at 751, app. D, table 2 at 806, app. C at 801-04.
95. Id. at 751 n.51.
96.

88 N.J.L. 273, 96 A. 60 (1915), aff'd, 88 N.J.L. 368, 96 A. 62 (1915).

97.

Auger & Simon Silk Dyeing Co. v. East Jersey Water Co., 88 N.J.L. 273,

274-75, 96 A. 60, 61 (1915), afj'd, 88 N.J.L. 368, 96 A. 62 (1915).

98.

Id at 275-76, 96 A. at 61.
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circumstances.99
Eastern courts have not addressed themselves to the
question whether the waste assimilative capacity of streams
should be protected from upstream diversions so that downstream riparians may make reasonable waste discharges.
The only case to deal with an appropriate fact situation rejected the basic notion of a riparian right to discharge wastes
to a reasonable extent and, therefore, rejected the assimilative capacity protection argument automatically.
IV. PUBLIC RIGHT TO PROTECT STREAMFLOWS
In many states, the public has a right to use the surface
of public streams. Those are defined either as navigable
streams' °° or as streams capable of floating sawlogs or recreational boats. 0' The cases involve access and obstructions to
passage. There are no cases discussing, much less recognizing, a right of members of the public to obtain injunctions to
protect streamsflows needed to maintain the public's right to
use lakes and streams for boating, fishing, and swimming.
This is not to say no such cause of action exists. An absence
of cases means the question is unanswered. There are no
cases in which a public agency has asserted a right to protect
streamflows for maintenance of the public's enjoyment of
boating, swimming, and fishing. Whether such a cause of
action exists in the absence of statute is undecided by the
cases. Public agencies have attempted to protect streamflows
needed for public water supplies. The extent to which such
public use of water will be preferred over private riparian
99.

But ef United States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966),

where the federal government was not required to pay compensation where the state
imposed waste discharge limitations under a new statutoly permit statute designed to
protect the quality of water in a new federal reservoir because alleged common law
rights to discharge wastes and to utilize the assimilative capacity of a river were
impaired.
100. See, e.g., Schulte v. Warren, 218 Ill. 108, 75 N.E. 783 (1905); Lakeside Park
Co. v. Forsmark, 396 Pa. 389, 153 A.2d 486 (1959).
101. See, e.g., Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960); Elder v.
Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954); Willow River Club v. Wade, 100 Wis.
86, 76 N.W. 273 (1898).
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uses may suggest the limits of any future public streamflow
protection for recreational and natural habitat purposes.
A. Protection of Streamflows for Public Water Supplies
A major use of streams is diversion for public water
supply purposes. Such diverters seek to make the streamflows on which they depend secure from competing diversionary uses. This section analyzes the few cases dealing
with that question.
1. Diversion for Public Water Supply Treated as
Ordinary Riparian Use
One method to protect the use of streamflows as sources
of public water supplies is to seek to classify it as a use entitled to special protection from competing diversionary uses.
In general, most courts refuse to give public water supply
diversions any special status or protection. This means both
that public water supply entities are not entitled to injunctive
relief to halt competing diversions upstream and that they
are subject to injunctions favoring competing downstream
diversions.
The law reports are replete with cases in which a municipality or a public utility seeks to supply the city's inhabitants with water diverted from a lake or watercourse. Lower
riparian proprietors anxious to curtail such large diversions
object upon different theories. Two of their arguments are:
(1) the lack of any riparian interest in the water by the city
for the benefit of its residents and (2) the unreasonableness
of diverting such significant quantities of water. The typical
result is for the municipality, which had previously been diverting the water without any compensation to the lower riparians, to exercise its power of eminent domain. The lower
riparians still are left without the benefit of the flow. However, they receive monetary awards in exchange for their lost
property rights. But that disposition of those cases means
that most courts do not accord public water supplies the special preemptive status accorded to domestic diversions. Instead, diversions for public water supplies initially are
treated like any other riparian diversionary use.
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There is a special complication in public water supply
cases which does not ordinarily exist with private diversions.
The water is sold and used by individual lot owners in the
cities supplied. Most of them are not riparian. Hence, the
diversion for public water supply usually is characterized as
being -a nonriparian diversion. That means that the usual
riparian rights rules do not apply. Instead, the diversion is
treated as unlawful. 0 2 It would be enjoinable but for the

fact that it is for a public purpose. As a result, the courts
usually require compensation to be paid for the injuries resulting from the diversion because the diversion amounts 0to3
a taking of private property rights without compensation.
Since instream recreational and natural habitat uses are
riparian, and diversions for public water supplies usually are
nonriparian, the vast bulk of the public water supply cases
are irrelevant to determine the courts' possible attitude toward public protection of instream uses. However, if a diversion for public water supply were treated as a riparian
diversion, the relation of that diversion to other riparian uses
in such a case would be relevant.
Only one jurisdiction, Ohio, has treated a public water
supply diversion as a diversion to riparian land. In City of
Canton v. Shock,"° the court did this by treating the entire
city as riparian by a dubious analogy to sewage discharges
by the city. As a riparian proprietor, it had the right to reasonably divert water for the use of its citizens. Then the
court found that as long as the use was reasonable and the
municipality returned the unused water to the stream, the
legal rights of lower riparians were not invaded. It held that
during seasons when the water supply was low the city and
102. See, e.g., City of Elbertson v. Hobbs, 121 Ga. 749, 49 S.E. 779 (1905); Pernell
v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E.2d 449 (1941).
103. See, e.g., Burden v. Stein, 27 Ala. 104 (1855); Dimmock v. City of New
London, 157 Conn. 9, 245 A.2d 569 (1968); Smith v. City of Rochester, 38 How. Pr.
612, aft'd, 104 N.Y. 674 (1886); Gallagher v. Kingston Water Co., 25 A.D. 82, 49
N.Y.S. 250, afldmem., 164 N.Y. 602, 58 N.E. 1087, 49 N.Y.S. 250 (1898); In re Van
Etten, 184 A.D. 414, 171 N.Y.S. 1034 (1918); Lonsdale Co. v. City of Woonsocket, 25
R.I. 428, 56 A. 448 (1903).
104. 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600 (1902).
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the lower riparian should divide the water so that any losses
would be shared.
In this single case, the court treated the public water
supply diversion as an ordinary riparian diversion subject to
the usual reasonable use theory rules. This single teaching
suggests that if this precedent were applied to public agency
flow maintenance for recreational and natural habitat purposes, the public agency would have to share the available
water supply with private riparians.
However, as discussed previously, most courts do not
consider diversions for public water supply purposes to be a
valid diversion to riparian land. Hence, it is entitled neither
to protection from competing upstream diversions, however
large,1°5 nor are competing downstream diversions required
to share the water supply. 0 6 Only when the public water
supply diversion does not interfere with downstream riparian uses may it be immune from injunctive relief on the
grounds that it is a nonriparian use. 107
2.

Statutes Prohibiting Competing Diversions Are

Unconstitutional
A second method to protect streamflow sources of public water supplies is to enact statutes or ordinances prohibiting competing diversions. Generally, such statutes or
ordinances are unconstitutional unless compensation is paid
because riparians are deprived of their proprietary rights to
divert water under the riparian rights doctrine. 0 8 A public
water supply entity cannot improve its legal position as a
diverter under the riparian rights doctrine by enacting legislation purporting to deny to other riparians their rights
under the same doctrine.
105. Cf Kennebunk, Kennebunkport & Wells Water Dist. v. Maine Turnpike
Auth., 145 Me. 35, 71 A.2d 520 (1950).
106. Cf. Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978 (1907).
107. Cf.Stratton v. Mount Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87
(1913).
108. Cf George v. Village of Chester, 59 Misc. 553, 111 N.Y.S. 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1908), af'dmem., 137 A.D. 889, 121 N.Y.S. 1131 (1910), modfied, 202 N.Y. 398, 95
N.E. 767 (1911); Bino v. City of Hurley, 273 Wis. 10, 76 N.W.2d 571 (1956).
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V. CONCLUSION
The case decisions lend moderate support for a riparian
right to level and flow maintenance for recreational purposes. There is no precedent one way or the other concerning such a riparian ri-ht for natural habitat purposes. There
are no cases discussing any right in members of the public or
in public agencies to enjoin riparian diversions encroaching
on flows or levels needed for recreational or natural habitat
activities by members of the public. If such a right were recognized in public agencies, the single public water supply
diversion case which treats the diversion as riparian suggests
that instream uses must share the water supply with diversionary uses. However, the private level and flow maintenance precedent probably would apply to public agency
cases as well. The net conclusion to be reached is that the
courts seem willing to establish minimum levels and flows
for instream recreational uses, free from encroachment by
diversions, which are enforceable by affected riparians.
There is no precedent inhibiting a court from extending that
right to public agencies acting on behalf of members of the
public, to members of the public themselves, and to natural
habitat uses.
Since the case law leaves so many questions undecided,
the best way to settle the level and flow maintenance question is enactment of level and flow regulatory legislation. 0 9

109. Such legislation could stand alone or be incorporated into a comprehensive
diversion permit statute. See Davis, supra note 6; MissouR INSTREAM FLOW REQUIREMENTS, supra note 1, at 319-27.
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